Trump’s election has checkmated Iran

If Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ is followed with maximum support for the Iranian people, there may not be a theocracy left in Iran

“We’re about to go onto the streets to hand out sweets.” This was the message sent from a friend celebrating Donald Trump’s victory – not in Texas but in Tehran.
Yes, the Iranian people are overwhelmingly celebrating The Donald’s White House return. This may shock readers, but the explanation is simple: Trump’s election has checkmated the Ayatollah’s regime in Iran – a regime the Iranian people have been desperate to overthrow for decades.
Trump’s election is the worst possible scenario for supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his brutal ideological paramilitary, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
“Iran was broke when I was in office” has been one of Trump’s favourite campaign refrains. And it gives a clear indication that one of his first foreign policy steps will be the revival of his “maximum pressure” policy on the regime.
Trump’s “maximum pressure”, which saw the U.S. exit the 2015 nuclear deal and re-impose sanctions, particularly on Iran’s IRGC-controlled oil and gas sectors, was highly effective. Iranian oil exports – the regime’s main funding source for terror proxies – plummeted to 200,000 barrels per day. Even China, concerned about U.S. market access, complied with the sanctions, depriving Tehran of billions of dollars.
There is no denying that “maximum pressure” brought the regime’s economy to its knees and significantly hurt the IRGC’s terrorist militia network’s ability to function: from Hamas to Hezbollah.
Under the Democrats, the abandonment of “maximum pressure”, allowed the regime to export as much as $139 billion in oil sales, and access billions in unfrozen assets. This cashflow directly enabled the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel.
But drying up Khamenei’s cashflow won’t be Trump’s only blow to the IRGC and its terrorist proxies. It is almost certain that the president-elect will restore US military deterrence in the Middle East to make the ayatollah and his friends think twice about launching attacks.
In the past four-years, the Biden administration has made it clear to Khamenei that the US will not impose direct military consequences on the IRGC, including when the IRGC’s proxies killed three US soldiers in January this year. This approach shaped the Iranian regime’s calculus and made them believe that they could get away with escalation without repercussions.
The result has been unprecedented direct missile attacks on Israel and the ramping-up of its nuclear program to near-weapons grade level (something that did not occur under Trump despite withdrawing from the nuclear deal). This marks a stark difference from when Trump shocked Tehran by ordering the killing of the IRGC’s notorious terrorist commander Qassem Soleimani after his proxies killed a US citizen. Trump would not only restore US deterrence in the Middle East, but would likely lift constraints on Israel’s efforts to dismantle the IRGC’s terrorist network.
Could Khamenei turn to his powerful friend in Moscow for support? Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ayatollah has provided Vladimir Putin with missiles and drones, hoping to secure a strategic relationship. But Trump could be the ultimate homewrecker in this Putin-Khamenei “love affair”. If Trump strikes a deal in Ukraine that satisfies Moscow, would Putin stay faithful to the ayatollah? History suggests Putin isn’t known for commitment and would have no problem dumping Khamenei to satisfy his own needs.
With few options, surely the ayatollah would have no choice but to shake hands with what he calls “the Great Satan”, after all Trump is a dealmaker?
But this is where the checkmate move strikes.
Khamenei cannot be seen shaking hands with the man who killed Soleimani. In the eyes of the regime’s small but radical consistency, Soleimani was akin to a messianic Islamist idol. Against the backdrop of unprecedented anti-regime sentiment and looming protests, Khamenei cannot afford to lose the young Soleimani zealots who have consistently taken to the streets to uphold the regime through the suppression of Iranian civilians and protestors.
Together this could put the Islamist regime in Iran in its weakest position in 45-years. If Trump’s maximum pressure is followed with maximum support for the Iranian people, by the end of Trump’s presidency there may not be a theocracy left in Iran.
Trump may not seek overt regime change as a policy, but it may be one of the inadvertent consequences of his actions. After all, for Trump, politics is personal and if a “revenge list” does exist, Khamenei — whose regime has spent the past 4 years trying to assassinate the president-elect — will almost certainly feature at the top.
Kasra Aarabi is Director of IRGC Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)